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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Misguided Reaction: Reconsidering Intelligence Flow 
 
Before 11 September 2001. (August 2004) 
 
John Samuel Prothro, B.A., Vanderbilt University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Charles Conrad 
 
 
 This research examines the story of 11 September 2001 from an organizational 
communication perspective.  Discourse after the event pointed to "communication 
difficulties" as a scapegoat for the intelligence community's failure.  These analyses are 
misguided.  Therefore, I examine our government's answer to communication 
difficulties--more bureaucracy.  The many communication hindrances associated with 
bureaucracy are discussed as reasons to rethink our government's reaction.   Finally, 
further research and recommendations are discussed. 
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A popular child’s toy features soccer ball-style hollow plastic with differently 
shaped holes and several corresponding molds that must be matched and slid into the 
spaces.  Playing the game teaches a child to notice similarities and recognize 
associations.  Oftentimes, a young child will try to force a star into a square or even a 
circle into a triangle, but always without success.  Likewise, if one would have entered 
my office while I was typing my first two chapters, he or she might have envisioned a 
child bent-backed, straining, and frustrated, trying to burrow a star so my triangle would 
fit.  At least I gave up.   
 My straining is precisely why the reader needs a reading guide, so here goes:  
The first two chapters, and especially the second, are the result of trying to force 
preconceived notions about 9-11 and organizational communication into a space that 
agreed with neither.  In the first, I present a justification for the study (a study I 
envisioned would fit the star). The second is a useful exercise in academic processing 
and can be used as a handy information flow encyclopedia.  Therefore, the attuned 
reader will read the first chapter with a sense of irony, and the second will be viewed on 
its individual worth.  The final three are the meat in the stew, so they may be chewed 
and hopefully appreciated.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE CASE FOR A DIFFERENT OUTLOOK 
 
On the tragic day of 11 September 2001, thousands of American lives were 
lost in the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history.  Appropriately, in the nearly two 
years following the calamity, concerned citizens of all sorts have sought to 
improve their knowledge of September 11 and apply their newfound discernment 
in order to advance some aspect of American interaction.  This thesis is a new 
angle on that process.  Much discourse after the incident has studied 
communication “breakdowns” within the intelligence community (IC).  However, 
little examination has occurred using the framework of organizational 
communication theory to understand those “breakdowns.”  My goal is not to assess 
blame or even necessarily fix all intelligence communication problems; but rather, 
to apply the unique knowledge of organizational communication research to the 
study of this particular calamity.  In the end, I sincerely hope to have presented a 
distinct and useful insight that can help improve how the American government 
reacts to intelligence failures. 
 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style and format of Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 
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Justification 
Before going any further, I must present a disclaimer.  First, due to the 
sensitive nature of the material, the foundation of this research is limited to that 
which has been cleared for public use.  As one academic insightfully recognized 
following the Cuban Missile Crisis:  
 
The social science literature on problems of foreign intelligence 
is nevertheless extremely small.  This is regrettable because 
historians and social scientists have developed and are 
developing skills that should permit substantial contributions to 
the theory and even to the practice of intelligence.  However, 
since the work of the intelligence services is necessarily 
classified, very little material appears in the public domain and 
academic scholars are deprived of the information on which to 
base relevant researches.1 
 
Fortunately, in this case some valuable texts (Congressional reports, hearings, 
intelligence leaks, etc.) regarding terrorism, the September 11 attacks, and 
intelligence organizations are in the public domain.  But while there is enough 
material accessible to draw functional conclusions, applicable documents are not 
released with regard to my schedule.  Consequently, this topic requires that I 
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continue to revise—and even correct—my conclusions as more information is 
released for public evaluation.   
Another obstacle with this research is the problematic nature of the 
situation.  It should be noted that highly unlikely events, by definition, cannot 
always be anticipated or prevented, and persistent finger-pointing only serves to 
divide the country and further damage the society.  Recognizing the misgivings of 
hindsight, it is exigent to point to a mishap and call it a “failure,” and, given the 
frequency of surprise attacks,2 one is properly reluctant to chastise particular 
persons or groups for alleged errors.  It is careless to only identify mistakes “after 
the fact” in order to suggest someone or some organization is to blame.  
Admittedly, the natural, emotional reaction to tragic events is to find a scapegoat, 
but I have done my best to avoid this temptation.  Instead, I have replaced finger-
pointing with a concerted effort to provide a better understanding of the situation 
in the hopes that my research may one day assist in terrorism prevention.   
The study of the Pearl Harbor attacks is a relevant comparison.  
Immediately following the Second World War, researchers passionately focused 
their attention towards the subject of Japan’s surprise attack.  As Alvin D. Coox 
recognized, “The smoke had barely lifted from the blazing hulks at Pearl Harbor 
on 7 December 1941, when the first American critics began to point accusing 
fingers at those held responsible for the disaster in Hawaii.”3  Many writings 
accused officials of negligence while the conspiracy theorists even charged that 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt colluded with other high-ranking officials to 
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secretly lure the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor; thus, granting the Roosevelt 
Administration justification for war.4  “Put simply,” explains Coox, “the highest 
American officials, from the President down, were allegedly implicated in a 
deliberate plot and a massive cover-up designed to drag the reluctant, isolationist 
United States through the back door to war, by enticing the Japanese into 
launching a pre-emptive, surprise operation that would be sufficient to enrage the 
American people but insufficient to damage American prospects for ultimate 
victory.”5 
Fortunately, research has produced at least two plausible Pearl Harbor 
theories.6  The first attributes the breakdowns to the introduction of “noise” into 
intelligence gathering and the lack of an analytical frame needed to classify the 
data.  This theory states that the excessive intelligence information the U.S. 
obtained was categorized and misperceived simply because an effective system did 
not exist that could process it.  The intelligence that could have prepared the U.S. 
for the attacks at Pearl Harbor was available, but the amount of data was so 
enormous, it was impossible to fully evaluate.    The United States had been 
negotiating with Japan, and American intelligence had recently cracked the 
Japanese code (code named MAGIC) used to advise diplomatic efforts and 
command ship movements.  Combined with field intelligence gathering, all these 
efforts proved to be too much data for the American intelligence system to handle.7  
“In short,” as Roberta Wohlstetter writes, “we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not 
for want of the relevant materials, but because of the plethora of irrelevant ones.”8 
5 
Without an effective process to separate the “noise” from the valuable material, the 
important data was lost in the information overload. 
 The second theory was outlined by Abraham Ben-Zvi’s study of surprise 
attacks.  He acknowledged that many researchers recognized intelligence failures 
stemmed from misconceptions about the enemy.  In other words, the tactical 
information was flowing into Washington, but the imperative data was disregarded 
because it did not fit the strategic assumptions of those in power.9  For example, 
many high-ranking American officials such as Secretaries Stimson and 
Morgenthau believed that “so long as the United States maintained an overall 
military advantage over Japan, war was unlikely to break out.”10  The Japanese, 
they reasoned, would not want to challenge or provoke the United States with a 
preemptive attack.  
These types of preconceptions possibly distorted the information coming 
from the field11 because, inevitably in organizations, superiors knowingly or 
unknowingly communicate their assumptions and beliefs to their employees.  
Consequently, those employees are more likely to collect, assess, and “send up” 
information they believe the power holders will deem credible.  As one researcher 
James P. Walsh stated, “While the benefits of employing…top down information 
processing theory… structures are widely noted, there is a growing concern that 
they can limit decision makers’ abilities to understand their information 
environments and thus, compromise their decision making.”12   Before Pearl 
Harbor, it is possible the high-ranking officials distorted the interpretation of the 
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information they were provided—leaving the U.S. blind to the subsequent attacks.  
Concerning the American leadership one cryptoanalyst supposedly pronounced, 
“But they knew, they knew, they knew.”13   
Still, partly because of the blame game, most of the research regarding 
Pearl Harbor provided little pragmatic knowledge.  As Ben-Zvi rightly pointed out: 
“The need still remains to convert ‘post-mortems of past intelligence 
performances’ into an operational theory of intelligence, a theory which will 
categorize the key variables associated with the past cases of surprise and develop 
a cluster of ‘sophisticated expectations about surprises.’14  It is impractical, 
therefore, to simply underline mistakes made by intelligence organizations. In 
Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable, Richard 
Betts agrees: 
 
Negative or descriptive theory—the empirical understanding of 
how intelligence systems make mistakes—is well developed.  
The distinction is significant because there is little evidence that 
either scholars or practitioners have succeeded in translating 
such knowledge into reforms that measurably reduce failure.15 
 
He later outlines several basic barriers recognized by the negative theorists to be 
inherent to intelligence undertakings.  He states, “Beyond the barriers that 
authority, organization, and scarcity pose to intelligence lie more fundamental and 
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less remediable intellectual sources of error.” These include the “basic barriers to 
analytic accuracy,” or, in other words, well-intentioned but ineffective repairs used 
after tragic intelligence failures.  They are:   
 
I. Ambiguity of Evidence—‘It is the role of intelligence to 
extract certainty from uncertainty.” 
II. Ambivalence of Judgment—‘Where there are 
ambiguous and conflicting indicators (the context of most 
failures of intelligence), the imperatives of honesty and accuracy 
leave a careful analyst no alternative but ambivalence.’ 
III. Atrophy of Reforms—‘Disasters always stimulate 
organizational changes designed to avert the same failures in the 
future.  In some cases these changes work.  In many instances, 
however, the changes persist formally but erode substantively.’ 
 
These repairs, while well meaning, are also modeled after low-probability past 
events—making them oftentimes irrelevant in the future.  Afterwards, Betts 
summarizes other research that addresses the frequent responses to tragedy that 
contribute to the “elusiveness of solutions”: 
 
I.   Assume the Worst—‘A common reaction to traumatic 
surprise is the recommendation to cope with ambiguity and 
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ambivalence by acting on the most threatening possible 
interpretations.  If there is any evidence of threat, assume it is 
valid, even if the apparent weight of contrary indicators is 
greater.’ 
II.      Multiple Advocacy—‘Blunders are often attributed to 
decision makers’ inattention to unpopular viewpoints (those that 
contradict upper management assumptions) or to a lack of access 
to higher levels of authority by dissident analysts.  To reduce the 
chances of such mistakes 
 . . . one might propose . . . institutionalizing a balanced, open, and 
managed process of debate . . . Confidence that it will help 
systematically and substantially should be tentative. 
 III.   Consolidation—‘According to the logic of estimative 
redundancy, more analysis is better than less . . . On the other 
hand, according to the logic of those who focus on the time 
constraints of leaders and the confusion that results from 
innumerable publications, quantity counteracts quality.’ 
IV.   Devil’s Advocacy—‘Multiple advocacy ensures that all 
views held by individuals within the analytic system will be 
granted serious attention.  Some views that should receive 
attention, however, may not be held by anyone within the 
system.’ 
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V.           Sanctions and Incentives—‘Some critics attribute 
intelligence failures to dishonest reporting or the intellectual 
mediocrity of analysts.  Suggested remedies include threats of 
punishment for the former, and inducements to attract talent to 
replace the latter.  Other critics emphasize that, will or ability 
aside, analytic integrity is often submerged by the policy makers’ 
demands for intelligence that suits them.16 
 
Instead of creating similar negative theory that does little to improve the 
organizations, a practical understanding of the 9-11 situation should be developed.  
Negative theory tends to assess blame without a pragmatic framework for 
improvement.  This type of scrutiny can, in fact, inhibit the formation of much-
needed descriptive theory and analysis and limit the means for progress.  In 
addition, it can encourage cover-ups, which further short-circuits the "learning" 
process. 
 It is difficult to determine an “intelligence failure” and assess blame after a 
surprise attack for two main reasons.  First, surprise attacks, by definition, are hard 
to predict given the precautions taken by those who plan them.  Though it is 
impossible to prevent “well-planned” terrorism, the political reaction is to attempt 
to predict or control every terrorist occurrence.  This recognition is why some 
“risk-management” literature says planners should focus their attention on 
preventing the most likely sources of danger while ignoring the least likely ones.    
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Second, as we see very often in terrorism situations, intelligence 
organizations are trying to rationally understand those who, from their point of 
view seem “irrational.”  “The behavior of people within a culture different from 
one’s own often appears irrational when in fact they act rationally (from their own 
perspective),” 17 explains Klaus Knorr.  Determining how someone from a 
dissimilar background will behave is a difficult undertaking, especially since, if 
they are “rational,” they will most likely plan something their enemy least expects. 
            Furthermore, Richard Betts essentially believes intelligence failures are 
unavoidable.  Here, while outlining a good example, he analyzes the inherent 
paradoxical entanglements involved in intelligence gathering and reporting: 
 
Again, there are two fundamental points.  First, within 
the context of a glut of ambiguous data, intelligence officials 
linked to operational agencies (primarily military) tend to 
indulge a propensity for justifying service performance by 
issuing optimistic assessments, while analysts in autonomous 
non-operational units . . . tend to produce more pessimistic 
evaluations.  Second, in contrast to cases of attack warning, 
fragmentary tactical indicators of success tend to override more 
general and cautious strategic estimates.  Confronted by differing 
analyses, a leader mortgaged to his policy tends to resent or 
dismiss the critical ones, even when they represent the majority 
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view of the intelligence community, and to cling to the data that 
support continued commitment.18 
 
After delineating several of these intrinsic obstacles associated with 
intelligence, Betts summarizes that intelligence failures are to be expected, and 
researchers can only hope to alter the IC slowly and delicately.  Given these 
complications, I have attempted to distinguish between mere hindsight and that 
which could be considered workable, reasonable expectations regarding the 
American IC.   
It is important to note that there is a potential use for hindsight in research.  
Retrospection does allow researchers to reexamine and improve conclusions.  In 
my observations, hopefully I can provide a new perspective through which to 
understand the events before 9-11.  Intelligence must not only be gathered, it must 
be presented and unraveled.  Fittingly, this thesis will look at the 9-11 situation 
from a new and distinct organizational communication angle.  By examining the 
communicative dynamics involved in intelligence gathering and reporting, I will 
illuminate the learning process from a unique and practical organizational 
perspective. 
 
Theoretical Method 
The study of organizational communication is an expanding arena.  More 
and more people are recognizing the need to understand the direct influence of 
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communication variables in the workplace.  This is not a new enterprise, however.  
“Since the beginning of recorded history, organizational employees have 
recognized the crucial role that communication plays in their success.”19  Around 
2000 B.C., Pharaoh Ptah-hotep advised his sons in the “importance of listening 
skills, the need to seek advice and information from their subordinates, the 
importance of staying informed about what was taking place around them, and the 
necessity of clearly explaining each worker’s tasks and documenting these 
instructions in writing."20 What we term as “modern” studies in organizational 
communication began in the late 1930’s to early 1940’s, and, since then, the field 
has expanded its influence in a broad range of theoretical directions.21  
Accordingly, organizational communication theory can also provide us a lens 
through which to assess intelligence organizational practices.  By taking a 
communication approach, this thesis provides a unique yet advantageous point 
from which to understand the intelligence situation pre-911.   
There are innumerable organizational research applications that are 
pertinent to this study.  I recognize the limitations of time and even paper 
associated with trying to incorporate every topic available.  Given these restraints, 
I have in Chapter II examined some of the barriers to information flow intrinsic to 
organizations. 
There are multiple conceptualizations regarding why intelligence failures 
happen.  One in particular, pathologies of communication, may be a useful 
conceptualization for this study.  It is described in this way: 
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The most frequently noted sources of breakdowns in intelligence 
lie in the process of amassing timely data, communicating them 
to decision makers, and impressing the latter with the validity or 
relevance of the information.  This view of the problem leaves 
room for optimism because it implies that procedural curatives 
can eliminate the dynamics of error.  For this reason, official 
post mortems of intelligence blunders inevitably produce 
recommendations for reorganization and changes in operating 
norms.22 
  
There is some research suggesting that reorganization is a rhetorical act--that is, it 
does little to improve the effectiveness of the organization, but instead satisfies the 
desires of external constituents.  The organizational actors may or may not believe 
the actions actually make a difference, but the outcome is the same. 
There are also debatable assumptions regarding organizational learning.  
One theoretical camp believes that, “Theories of organizational learning,” as 
Barbara Levitt and James G. March accept, “can be distinguished from theories of 
analysis and choice which emphasize anticipatory calculation and intention.”23  In 
other words, practices, rituals, and other “normal” behavior are what organization 
members “learn.”  From this theoretical perspective, people do not purposely learn 
from “calculation and intention;” they instead learn from norms that become 
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ingrained action.  This thinking is incomplete, however.  Recognizing the 
situational challenges involved (complexity of situation, density of problems, etc.), 
organizational members can purposely learn from their mistakes, apply newfound 
knowledge to their behavior, and better their surroundings through what they have 
learned.  A more inclusive interpretation of organizational learning, therefore, is 
helpful to this study.  As Stuart Macdonald of the Warwick Business School in 
England points out, deliberative change can be part of organizational learning:  
 
Without learning there can be no change, at least none that is not 
speculative or accidental…The organization must seek most of 
the new information required for change in the outside world.  It 
must bring home this new information to be mixed with resident 
information to shape a novel pattern of knowledge into a 
package that can be used.24 
 
This thesis recognizes that “the essence of change in the organization is the 
external information required for learning.”25 And without learning, intentional 
change is impossible.  Not that intentional learning is necessarily more useful than 
unintentional, but it is certainly the only process this writing can hope to advance.  
This research should, therefore, attempt to understand organizational behavior 
before 9-11 so organizations can use that insight to one day enhance some aspect 
of interaction.  Understandably, this writing is a minute part of the whole process 
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of bettering our IC, but it can be a small contribution toward the understanding of 
surprise attacks and organizational learning. 
Still, as we will see in this study, change in organizations is not simple.  
Management research has considered the problems associated with change and 
determined that it is risky, difficult, and constrained by organizational structure 
and politics.  For instance, Nicole Woolsey Biggart studied the reorganization of 
the United States Postal Service and determined that change can be destructive.  
She found that when it occurs, those associated with the organization (both internal 
and external members) disrupt the workings of the organization by scrambling for 
available power and resources.  This competition leads to the formation of 
alliances and coups that seek to “overthrow” the existing powers instead of 
working with them.  Attempting to pacify the revolutionaries and remain in power, 
the present leadership can attack the goals and ideologies that existed before the 
transformations.26 Other researchers have found additional problems.  Robert A. 
Rothman, et al. found that employees whose lives will be disrupted because of 
certain changes tend to resist those changes,27 and Michael T. Hannan and John 
Freeman acknowledged that organization reconfiguration creates what they call 
“structural inertia.”28 That is, when members continually resist architectural 
change—prohibiting favorable outcomes. 
Though literature suggests the improbability of organizational change, 
some structural researchers acknowledge there are exceptions: “To claim that 
organizational structures are subject to strong inertial forces is not the same as 
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claiming that organizations never change.”29  Likewise, Heather A. Haven found, 
“When environmental conditions undergo a sudden (punctuational) transformation, 
change in organizational structures and activities will prove beneficial to short-run 
performance and long-run survival chances.”30  It can be concluded that, although 
slow, difficult, and painstaking, organizational change is possible.  Therefore, 
since organizations can enact beneficial change, adjustments should be considered 
only with the realization that modifications guarantee a certain number of growing 
pains.  In short, change is not always necessary and can be harmful, and those in 
power should resist unnecessary adjustments to their organizational system. 
It can be argued, regardless of the problems inherent to the installment of 
organizational change, a necessary step in that process is assessing communication 
breakdowns. I understand this thesis is most likely not going to immediately 
encourage change in intelligence organizations.  Instead, I will present a distinctive 
and beneficial framework through which to understand a portion of 9-11.  In doing 
so, I desire that this writing will prove to be a “step in the right direction,” and 
when combined with other strides, the United States can one day walk down the 
path toward a more efficient, effective, and successful IC.  
  
Historical Precedents 
Intelligence organizations have for a long time understood the importance 
of organizational adjustments in the fight against terror.  In 1982, Westview 
Special Studies in International Terrorism outlined the importance of 
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organizational structure changes in the IC.  Recognizing “the concern with 
organizations is relevant to the study of our governmental response to transnational 
terrorism,”31 the book detailed federal action pertaining to organizational changes 
after various terrorist attacks.  In September of 1972, for example, President Nixon 
responded to the massacre at Lod Airport and the Munich Olympics slayings by 
establishing the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.  The committee’s 
functions were to, among other things: 
 
Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity 
for the prevention of terrorism.  This will include such activities 
as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical 
protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign 
diplomats and diplomatic installations in the United States.32 
 
Even though the committee was abolished in 1977 due in large part to inaction, the 
Federal government continued to review and amend organizational strategy in 
order to prevent terrorist attacks.   
President Jimmy Carter not only created the National Security Council [an 
organization which purpose was to deal with intelligence information requiring 
presidential consideration], but he also used his time in office to revise the way 
various security organizational hierarchies function and precisely underline the 
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goals of the separate intelligence groups. The purpose of his efforts was to more 
effectively combat terrorism.33 
After Carter, the Reagan Administration also had to develop strategies to 
contest the rise of terrorism: 
 
By early 1986, terrorism had become a “growth industry.”  The 
number of terrorist incidents was up 30 percent, the number of 
injuries about 80 percent, and the death toll almost 300 percent.  
Moreover, Americans were increasingly being targeted:  a navy 
seal man killed during the June 1985 TWA hijacking, the elderly 
crippled Leon Klinghoffer thrown overboard the Achille Laura, 
an eleven-year-old girl killed during the Christmas 1985 attacks 
in the Rome and Vienna airports, and then in April 1986 the 
bombing of a West Berlin discoteque injuring 230 and killing 
two people, including an American soldier.34   
 
The Administration responded with a unique strategy termed “coercive 
diplomacy”—a new military approach to foreign policy that used strategic 
bombings and military strikes to deter and undermine suspected terrorists.  Instead 
of simply replacing foreign leaders, Reagan’s foreign policy team refocused their 
diplomatic efforts to control, upset, and restrain terrorist activities through tactical 
military strikes.35   
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 Organizational adjustments have also been used by George W. Bush’s 
administration to deal with the terror attacks of 9-11.  The White House announced 
the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to “create a structure that 
ensures information sharing across agency lines” as well as the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) with a new cabinet office “to add critical new 
capabilities in the area of information analysis and infrastructure protection.”  The 
President also announced organizational changes to be made in the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  The President 
motivated the FBI to establish and communicate that the prevention of terrorism is 
their primary goal, and they responded by developing a revolutionary data 
management system that benefits counter terrorism intelligence sharing. The CIA 
Director was encouraged to institute a new Associate Director of Central 
Intelligence for Homeland Security to “ensure timely, effective and secure flow of 
intelligence to agencies engaged in Homeland Security.”36  
Throughout the history of the IC, those in charge have altered and fine-
tuned the efforts and structures of their organizational interactions.  However, 
without first analyzing the communicative processes of intelligence organizations 
and understanding the dynamics involved, it may be impossible to know if any of 
this reorganization is liable to enhance the security of the United States.   
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CHAPTER II 
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW 
 
This chapter is a brief glossary of information flow.  The point here is not to 
present in-depth analysis of each, but rather to indicate the challenges faced in 
organizational communication and furnish a framework through which we can examine 
the actual case.   
 
Introduction 
 In order to understand the events preceding 9-11, one must first comprehend 
research regarding information processing in organizations.  A host of organizations 
compose the mammoth organization calmly titled the Intelligence Community (IC).   
The most prevalent and most important agencies in our story are the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).   Because each agency is in some sense attached, we should first consider 
what we know about information flow in a general organizational sense.  Afterwards, we 
can apply those processes to the Intelligence Community (IC). 
There is a tremendous amount of information, messages, and ideas generated 
within the IC, and, as we will see, it behooves organizations in general to determine the 
amount, quality, and clarity of messages generated.  Proficient information flow has 
been linked to increased worker production and efficiency while mistakes made with 
message processing leads to harmful outcomes.37  In order for information to be used 
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then, it must be processed effectively, quickly, and proficiently.  If messages are dots, 
and if we consider the goal of intelligence officials to be a “connecting of the dots;” this 
chapter will focus on the dots themselves—i.e. how they get developed, why some get 
ignored, why some disappear, and what micro-processes tend to spoil their progression.   
The previous considerations could take this study in several directions.  Given 
that organizations are information-processing bodies and messages are “chunks” of 
information,38 it is fitting for organizational communication scholars to determine how 
messages travel or “flow” throughout organizations as well as what factors help 
determine how those messages are received.  This chapter will narrow its focus away 
from information processing or decision-making research and center on information 
exchange within organizations.  In doing so, it will differ from the communication 
theory that focuses on outcomes and concentrate on the processes that produce those 
outcomes and the breakdowns that occur in those processes.   
Researchers are recognizing that formal organizational structures do not promote 
efficient and effective communication,39 and some barriers of information flow are 
directly unique to the flow’s direction.  Messages that flow upward—that is, from lower 
to higher members in the hierarchy—have many inherent problems.  Information 
“created” at the bottom of the pyramid must be passed upward to those in command—all 
the while being reinterpreted, reevaluated, and reprocessed.  Likewise, the “downward” 
or “top-down” communication in organizations has many barriers associated with it.  
Superiors must communicate the organization’s goals, systems, rules, and techniques 
while at the same time conveying a message of trust, leadership and clarity.  
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Recognizing these inhibitors to communication flow, researchers are recognizing the 
need to study communication obstacles within organizations.  The research in this area 
can be categorized into eleven areas: trust, influence, mobility, structure, networks, 
rivalry, message overload, ambiguity, status, bureaucracy, and styles of leadership.  
What follows is virtually an organizational communication glossary of these terms. 
 
Trust 
The first one, trust, is especially important in member communication and 
relationships.  For instance, in superior/subordinate relationships, low trust—the belief 
that the accuracy of the information from the superior is questionable—can be associated 
with “the subordinate’s disclosed tendency to block or withhold information.”40 This 
attitude can obviously be detrimental to the information exchange process because if the 
subordinate feels his/her superior is untrustworthy, he/she will likely believe the superior 
to also be ineffective and incapable of acting on the information (and vice-versa--what' 
been called the “Pelz effect”. But trust is an essential factor throughout organizations.  
As Karlene H. Roberts admits, “Insofar as group accomplishment is related to the 
accurate and open exchange of information, a lack of trust may impede data flow and 
reduce performance.”41   
 
Influence 
The second factor implicates influence and its effects on upward communication.  
The supervisor's perceived amount of influence or power can be important to the amount 
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of information provided by his/her subordinates but not on the quality of information 
given: 
    
Intuitively, the idea that a superior perceived as having high 
influence might be one to whom communication is guarded 
seems reasonable . . . subordinates with high influence superiors 
desire interaction and believe that accurate information is 
received from them.  Interestingly, however, influence does not 
exhibit any consistent relationship with the variables which 
might be precursors to inaccurate communications, i.e., 
distorting pressures or tendencies to withhold information.  It is 
related, however, to trust, mobility, and satisfaction with 
communication in general.42 
 
Therefore, a subordinate who perceives his leader to be a person of high influence may 
decrease the amount of information presented.  This is especially true if the information 
is negative or could be perceived as a negative comment regarding the subordinate’s job.  
 
Mobility 
 Research suggests that members in organizations are sometimes egocentric; i.e. 
they desire their goals over the goals of the organization.  Therefore, the motives of the 
individual may hinder the progress of the organization.  That is, he/she will only send 
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messages that promote his/her development and not the development of the 
organization.43  If a person is after his/her own advancement, or if the person feels he/she 
has not been properly rewarded by the organization, he/she may have the tendency to 
withhold or distort information that may be unhelpful to his/her cause.  Several factors, 
including the hierarchical structure of traditional organizations, lend themselves to these 
types of problems.  The pyramid chart obviously makes advancement a more difficult 
process the further one moves up the hierarchy.  Therefore, organizational members tend 
to become frustrated as their progression becomes more and more difficult, and their 
resentment translates into an egocentric behavior that is oppositional to the 
organization’s goals. 
 
Structure 
 The structure of an organization has a profound influence on the efficiency of the 
information flow.  Traditional hierarchical organizational charts seem to display a 
certain amount of uniformity and clarity.  However, the structure of an organization is 
more than its exposed diagram, and the organizational chart certainly does not govern 
message flow.  Although the operational networks usually do roughly approximate the 
organizational chart, members develop unrecorded networks, behave egotistically, 
withhold information from superiors, perform unpredictably, and even compensate for 
weaknesses in the formal system.  Still, the understanding of the organizational structure 
and how it affects information flow is an important undertaking, and there does “exist a 
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close relationship between the structure and the information efficiency in 
organizations.”44 
Message communication is sometimes structurally hindered because all 
information gets distorted when it is passed around.  The problem is most apparent when 
one message is passed vertically among organizational actors, but it exists generally in 
an organization’s everyday communication, regardless of the flow’s direction.  This 
paradox can be termed “structural distortion.”  A message is structurally distorted 
because “when one person communicates a message to another, each of them interprets 
it.”45  One can draw an analogy from a traditional parlor game.  The game is performed 
this way:  The members of the party sit around the room in a circle.  When called upon, 
one person will create a sentence that he or she whispers to the person sitting on the 
right. Each person then whispers the message to his or her neighbor until the last person 
has heard the message.  The humor is exposed when the person on the end reveals the 
incoherent or ridiculous message that has little to do with the original line.  In this “serial 
transmission” as Cynthia Stohl and W. Charles Redding term it, “messages may get 
modified or distorted because (1) the goal of one or more of the players is to change 
intentionally the message, (2) the mere number of people in the game makes it likely that 
the message will be transformed through subtle changes in each transmission, and (3) a 
sender or receiver may be unable to reproduce the identical message because of 
cognitive, physical, or social limitations.46   
Likewise, Conrad offers five structural barriers that alter messages: 
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I.  Condensed—messages sent are shorter and simpler than 
messages received. 
II. Accented—messages are simplified into good or bad, all or 
none, or other extreme terms 
III. Assimilated—messages are transformed so that they are similar 
to information the person received in the past and/or expects in the 
future. 
IV. Whitewashed—messages can be made to fit the interpreter’s 
frame of reference. 
V. Reductively coded—messages can be combined with other 
information to form a sensible overall picture, especially when the 
message is complex or ambiguous.47 
 
In an organizational hierarchy, those at the top rarely are in direct contact with the 
people who are actually generating the messages.  Before the decision makers in an 
organization actually receive a message, it has been through interpretation and 
reinterpretation several times and has in some ways changed its meaning.  This 
“filtering” process creates what Conrad recognizes as “a serious paradox for hierarchical 
organizations.”48   
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Networks 
 There are still other factors that have little to do with the supposed organizational 
hierarchy and more to do with general human interaction.  Research suggests that when 
members of an organization come together, they tend to form communication networks 
that determine who they talk to, who they listen to, and who they trust.  These “cliques” 
can be developed because of similar backgrounds, behaviors, interests, or, more likely, 
task requirements; and they can have a profound influence on the flow of information 
within the organization.  While some research acknowledges there are benefits to these 
networks, it has been shown they can harm the flow of information by perpetrating 
harmful attitudes, promoting member uncertainty, and withholding information.49  These 
“informal” networks sometimes develop because there is a breakdown somewhere 
within the information flow system, and they compensate for breakdowns in information 
flow within the formal networks. Consequently, some who should be “in the loop” of 
information get left out because for some reason they were not allowed in the informal 
network. 
 
Rivalry 
Rivalries and competitive behavior sometime develop between different groups, 
and message flow can in turn be disrupted.  Research regarding these rivalries is largely 
undeveloped, but this topic can be especially useful in the study of information flow.  As 
Kathleen Sutcliffe admits, “Research investigating the development of collaborative 
versus competitive interorganizational relations also may provide useful insights about 
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flows of information across organizational boundaries.”50  Therefore, understanding the 
competitive motivations of groups within organizations can help us comprehend the 
disruptions within message flow. 
 
Message Overload 
 After messages reach their destination, they still may be difficult to process.  
Stohl and Redding define “message overload” as “the transmission of new information 
at a rate that far exceeds the input-processing and output-capabilities of organizational 
actors.”51  In simpler terms, the amount of information coming in is too much for the 
member to “handle.”  Information overload has been shown to impede the overall 
decision-making process, and in hierarchical systems, “the excessive information load 
(has) caused a reduction in the productivity of individual employees as well as the entire 
organization.”52   
The topic of information overload has received much attention in the academic 
world.  Promoting the belief that organizations are information-processing systems, 
Charles A. O’Reilly found that information overload among managers is associated with 
poor performance, and the frequency of irrelevant information impeded the ability of 
individuals in the organization to work efficiently.  Therefore, he concluded 
organizations should determine the information-processing capacities of their members 
and match them with the information load encountered.53  A study conducted by Norman 
L. Chervany and Gary W. Dickson found that the most efficient business information 
systems reduce the amount of irrelevant information, which will develop confident and 
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superior decision-makers.54 There have even been studies on the overload of information 
in mechanical processes.  William V. Gehrlein and Peter C. Fishburn offered a more 
bewildering view of information overload.  Using the assumption that information 
overload is bad in human business interaction, they measured its influence on computer 
programs and other mechanical processes.  They determined the harmful effects of too 
much information apply to humans as well as problem-solving machines.55  Given this 
information, the research suggests in most cases organizations should seek to reduce the 
amount of irrelevant information in order to better organizational efficiency (a difficult 
task in high ambiguity cases). However, it is often unclear how much information is too 
much, and managers have a difficult time understanding the processing capacity of their 
workers.  Furthermore, as we learned earlier, exorbitant amounts of information must be 
filtered throughout the structure of the organization, leaving some information 
“untouched” by the decision-makers.    
 
Ambiguity 
 There is also much discussion on the topic of ambiguity in message flow.  While 
the use of “strategic ambiguity” has been recognized as an advantageous behavior, there 
are some who point out it is hard to sometimes draw the line between strategic ambiguity 
and the subtly deceptive and harmful behavior researchers term “double talk.”56  This 
can certainly be a barrier to information flow because the message sender holds back 
information that may be useful to the receiver in an effort to distort information. 
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Status 
 The emphasis on the status of a member can harm the information he or she 
receives.  When status is accented, Conrad points out that messages tend to be more 
formal, written, and business oriented; when de-emphasized, organizations become more 
efficient, the employees trust their superiors more, and communication increases.  Status 
emphasis can also influence the accuracy of the information given because “information 
is distorted even more when there are sizable differences in power or status between two 
people…”57  
 
Bureaucracy 
 Other factors that negatively influence information flow are inherent in 
bureaucratic organizations.  Conrad recognizes three ways bureaucracies tend to frustrate 
their members:  (1) they transmit information slowly, (2) there is limited space available 
for advancement, and (3) supervisors that enforce rules emphasize status difference.  The 
organizational members will oftentimes respond to their aggravation by withholding or 
distorting information.58  In Chapter IV, this information flow barrier will be discussed 
in greater detail. 
 
Styles of Leadership 
 One line of research has examined the communication barriers associated with 
the different leadership styles.  Norman R. F. Maier looked at supervisors in a human 
relations program and underscored interpersonal barriers to downward communication.   
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The most interesting focus of his paper regards the way information barriers get created 
when leaders have a democratic technique.  The authority of the superior is subject to the 
wishes of the group as well as the expectations of the job, and the supervisor sometimes 
cannot divulge information such as company policies or practices, given the restraints 
inherent to the leadership style.  Otherwise vital information may be disregarded and 
unspoken because of the job’s boundaries.59 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly rehashed several influencers that can harm message flow 
in organizations.  An organization that produces tremendous amounts of information 
must also have a communication system that promotes efficient flow of information 
throughout the hierarchy.60 Intelligence organizations by nature produce massive 
amounts of information.  That information must be transmitted throughout the 
organization while weaving through the aforementioned barriers to message flow.  
Recognizing the inherent obstacles to information flow in organizations is the logical 
first step towards bettering intelligence organizations’ communication.  There is little 
doubt these problems will continue to exist regardless of the research done to curtail 
them, but people can take heart that communicative processes in organizations can be 
improved.   
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CHAPTER III 
PURE COMMUNICATION 
 
The next step to understanding 9-11 through an organizational communication 
lens is examining the story.  To recreate what happened before the events, I researched 
nearly every form of published material regarding intelligence pre 9-11.  The literature 
was limited to publicly released information, and, since the first inception, this chapter 
has been continually revised to accommodate changes.  Nevertheless, I hope to have 
pieced together a helpful outline of the foreknowledge of the American Intelligence 
Community (IC) and information flow breakdowns in the system.   
 Research regarding 9-11 has sought to determine “what we knew” before the 
attacks.  More specifically, critics have speculated whether there was information 
regarding the hijackers or al-Qaeda that could have prevented the catastrophe.   Reports 
have found some details.  For instance, researchers discovered a 1998 intelligence 
meeting where officials warned only substantial improvements in counterterrorism data 
collection would prevent a “catastrophic” attack.  They also exposed a classified 
document that contended Osama bin Laden would likely pose a long-term threat to the 
United States.  Almost immediately, these types of reports had reports blaming 9-11 
failures on communication.  Before we accept the default explanation of “poor 
communication,” however, it seems fitting to completely separate purely communicative 
mishaps from the rest of the story.  Consequently, I have tried in this chapter to present a 
clean look at communication—an uncontaminated version specifically identifying 
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communication instances that injured the goal of counterterrorism.  My challenge, 
though, is to recreate selected events intertwined with a massive amount of occurrences.  
As former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Louis Freeh put it, 
“Analyzing intelligence information can be like trying to take a sip of water coming out 
of a fire hydrant.”61  Nevertheless, I have researched the reports simply from a 
communication perspective, and I have done my best to offer here a few tastes from my 
theoretical cup. 
  
Three Hijackers 
  To begin, intelligence and law enforcement officials knew very little about the 
September 11 perpetrators.  Congressional research62 indicates that 16 of the 19 
hijackers were virtually unknown to the IC before the attacks.  Concrete knowledge of 
the hijackers, therefore, was limited to the three remaining terrorists—Khalid al-Midhar, 
Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Nawaf’s brother Salim al-Hazmi—all of which were involved with 
Pan Am Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon.  Here briefly is their story: 
In 1999, the IC began a nationwide effort to thwart terrorist activity. Given the 
upcoming millennium, United States intelligence members were sensitive to terrorist 
activity—more specifically, al-Qaeda and the confidants of Osama bin Laden.  During 
the heightened alert, intelligence services heard of a planned meeting scheduled January 
5-8 in Malaysia. Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi—two individuals possibly 
linked to a support network of the East Africa embassy bombers—were scheduled to 
meet with several people whom the CIA suspected to be terrorist operatives and al-
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Qaeda associates.  The Intelligence Services also knew a man named “Salem” (who one 
analyst reported may in fact be Nawaf’s brother) would be attending the meeting.  While 
the details of the Malaysia happenings are either unknown or undisclosed, it is clear 
intelligence personnel began watching the individual group members to determine their 
identities and plans. 
 As a result of the meetings, CIA discovered Khalid al-Midhar’s full name, his 
passport number, and his birth information, and it learned he had obtained from Saudi 
Arabia a multiple-entry visa that would not expire until April 2002.  In addition, the CIA 
determined Nawaf was on the departing plane next to someone with the name of al-
Hazmi. This discovery clued the Agency that Nawaf’s last name might actually be al-
Hazmi; but the detection was seemingly small news at the time, and the CIA did not 
distribute the new information throughout the rest of The Community. 
To not share the full name of Nawaf al-Hazmi, in hindsight, was unfortunate 
because the National Security Agency (NSA) database contained a man named Nawaf 
al-Hazmi whom it had determined had direct links to the Osama bin Laden network.  
Because the information did not meet either agency’s reporting thresholds, the NSA did 
not circulate its records throughout The Community (although it was available on their 
database), and the CIA did not disclose it had uncovered the full name. One CIA officer 
did, however, email an FBI official regarding the activities of al-Hazmi, but the email 
failed to mention his multiple-entry visa and the possibility of his entrance into the U.S.   
Another CIA employee, who had been assigned to develop better communication 
between the FBI and CIA, sent an email to his Agency colleagues detailing the briefings 
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given the FBI.  In those consultations, according to the CIA official, he stated his 
position was simply that nothing illegal or threatening had occurred, and if it did he 
would notify the FBI immediately.   
Not long after the Kuala Lumpur meetings, an overseas CIA office alerted 
headquarters and the special unit assigned to bin Laden that al-Hazmi (and later 
discovered, Khalid al-Midhar) had in fact entered the U.S. through Los Angeles 
International Airport.  According to the Joint Inquiry, a CIA member assigned 
specifically to track the movements of the Kuala Lumpur people did not recall receiving 
the transmission.  In fact, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, testified: 
“(no)body read that cable in the March time frame.”63 Perhaps the most troubling issue is 
the FBI was not alerted.  The Bureau was told nothing of the terrorist entering America 
and was unable, if it had desired, to track him after his arrival.  Still, the importance of 
this transmission is unclear.  While it did state that al-Hazmi was in the country, it 
essentially recommended inaction64—suggesting his arrival was considered 
insignificant.  Even if the cable had been entirely dispersed, it would perhaps not have 
sparked any additional intelligence operations on Khalid’s behalf. 
Unfortunately, there was another missed opportunity to better understand the al-
Qaeda threat. Although FBI headquarters had information connecting al-Midhar and al-
Hazmi to al-Qaeda, it did not disclose to their local offices the names or whereabouts of 
the men.  One office in particular, the San Diego Bureau, was in contact with an 
informant who had direct communication with both men during their stay in California.  
Had the San Diego office knew of the al-Qaeda connection, it could have urged a 
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particular informant to gain information regarding the men and their plans.  After 9-11, 
when the informant was questioned, he first expressed disbelief the men were involved 
and then described them as religious and unsuspicious.  Since then, doubts have been 
raised about the informant’s credibility and awareness. 
Given the eventual outcome of the terrorist meetings, the CIA and NSA missed a 
chance, albeit a diminutive one, to recognize the full names of the terrorists and, more 
importantly, their significance.  The IC could have used that information to place the 
three men on the State Department watchlist designed to register the names of certain 
people who may pose a threat to the United States.  If they had shown up on the 
watchlist trying to come into the United States, they could have been prohibited from 
entering.  Still, as NSA director Hayden testified to the Joint Inquiry, the intelligence 
response to the gathering at Kuala Lumpur, while noticeable in hindsight, was not a 
colossal error: 
 
At the time of the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, we had the al-Hazmi 
brothers, Nawaf and Salem, as well as Khalid al-Midhar, in our sights.  
We knew of their association with al-Qa’ida, and we shared this 
information with the Community.  I’ve looked at this closely.  If we 
had handled all of the above perfectly, the only new fact that we could 
have contributed at the time of Kuala Lumpur was that Nawaf’s 
surname (and perhaps that of Salem, who appeared to be Nawaf’s 
brother) was al-Hazmi.65 
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  During the investigation of the October 2000 USS Cole terrorist attack, CIA 
uncovered another connection linking al-Qaeda to the Malaysia meeting.  Tawfiq 
Mohamed Saleh Atash also known as Khallad, a principle planner of the strike, was 
recognized in surveillance photos taken at the meetings. In January 2001, after FBI 
informed CIA that Khallad had received money in Malaysia from two participants at the 
meeting, the CIA was able to solidly connect the Malaysia group, including al-Midhar 
and al-Hazmi, with the terrorist faction al-Qaeda.  But while this was an example of 
information sharing, there were times CIA did not completely disclose. 
During the Cole investigation, a CIA analyst contacted an Intelligence 
Operations Specialist (IOS) at FBI headquarters.  He wanted to know if a person in 
custody, related to the Cole attacks and known to have carried money for Khallad, could 
be identified in the Malaysia surveillance photos.  The IOS testified to the Joint Inquiry 
that she was not told during their meeting of al-Midhar’s (the identified man) potential 
travel to the United States, nor was she told Khallad was at the Malaysia gathering.  The 
same occurred when the CIA analyst flew with the IOS to meet with FBI officials in 
New York.  When asked by FBI officials why CIA was following Khalid al-Midhar, the 
analyst did not disclose.  In his testimony, he stated that the information was operational 
in nature, and it would not have been disclosed without permission.66  
Shortly thereafter, the organizations finally pieced together the situation.  On 30 
August 2001, FBI was informed regarding al-Midhar’s identification and travel to the 
United States.  Armed with the information that al-Midhar was connected to al-Qaeda, 
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the INS, FBI and CIA investigated and determined al-Midhar had entered the United 
States on 15 January 2000, left on 10 June 2000, and returned 4 June 2001 with a visa 
that would allow him to stay until August 22.  This information led to both the 
watchlisting of al-Midhar, al-Hazmi, Khallad, and one other person at the Malaysia 
meeting.  Accordingly, investigations were begun to determine if the terrorists were in 
the U.S.  
 
The Phoenix Memo 
 They were in America.  More specifically, they were working to develop piloting 
skills to guide the planes they would eventually hijack.  This preparation did not go 
unnoticed, however.  On alert for al-Qaeda’s next attack and aware of terrorist Ramzi 
Yousef’s disrupted plan to fly a small plane full of explosives into CIA headquarters, 
one Phoenix FBI field agent noticed an alarming pattern.  Many of the Islamic terrorist 
suspects he had been following were enrolling in a local flight school.   Consequently, he 
sent a letter to FBI headquarters.  In the letter he identified eight suspicious flight school 
applicants and recommended the FBI conduct a major investigation into the flight 
schools across the country: 
 
The purpose of this communication is to advise the Bureau and New 
York of the possibility of a coordinated effort of Usama bin Laden 
(UBL) to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation 
universities and colleges.  Phoenix has observed an inordinate number 
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of individuals of investigative interests who are attending or who have 
attended civil aviation universities and colleges in the state of Arizona.  
The inordinate number of these individuals attending these types of 
schools and fatwas (deleted from original) gives reasons to believe that 
a coordinated effort is underway to establish a cadre of individuals 
who will one day be working in the civil aviation community around 
the world.  These individuals will be in a position in the future to 
conduct terror activity against civil aviation targets.67   
 
 The Bureau ignored and failed to disseminate the memo for two main reasons.  
The first regards resources.  As FBI officials testified to the Joint Inquiry, they had too 
many agents tied up in the USS Cole investigation and did not have the manpower to 
investigate all the flight schools across the country.  The second reason stems from what 
is termed the bureau’s “politically correct” mentality at the time.  Investigating Middle 
Eastern men would have constituted racial profiling and risked litigation and/or 
Congressional criticism.  The risks, it seemed, were too large.  Regardless of the reasons, 
the memo was never even forwarded to the CIA or even the FAA, and the matter was 
essentially overlooked. In fact, the message was blocked before it even reached the top 
people in the FBI’s bureaucracy.68 
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Zacharias Moussaoui 
 One terrorist interested in flight training was a French-Moroccan from London 
named Zacharias Moussaoui.  Moussaoui unsuccessfully attended a Norman, Oklahoma 
flight school where he failed out after two months of training.  He was not discouraged, 
however, and began making plans to gain hours in flight simulator instruction.  In July of 
2001, Moussaoui began simulator training in Eagan, Minnesota at the Pan Am 
International Academy; but suspicious questions and the fact he did not care to learn to 
take off or land prompted one instructor to phone a friend at the local FBI office.  That 
night, Moussaoui was arrested on charges of visa violations.  Of course, the charges 
were constructed only to hold and investigate him, but after he denied agents the right to 
view the contents of his laptop, they became suspicious.  Their suspicion was confirmed 
when French intelligence officials reported that Moussaoui had radical fundamentalist 
connections. 
  Even after the French issued a second report directly linking him to al-Qaeda and 
terrorist activities, requests were denied, however, for search warrants to examine 
Moussaoui’s computer.  The reason behind the denial is shocking.  In a memo written by 
Colleen Rowley, the Special Agent and the Minneapolis Office general counsel, she 
complained the Washington supervisor who presented the case for the search warrant to 
the national security court omitted French intelligence reports.  Even more disturbing, 
though, is the FBI’s failure to transmit to other intelligence agencies the information 
regarding Moussaoui’s arrest.  When the Minneapolis FBI agents finally informed the 
CTC in late August, their superiors in Washington reprimanded them.  After September 
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11, U.S. officials suspected Moussaoui was supposed to be the missing fifth hijacker on 
United Airlines flight 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania without reaching its target.69 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE OVERREACTION 
 
The last chapter was only nine pages.  After breaking down the story into pure 
communication mishap and recognizing the scarcity of material, I am left with the 
unlikely conclusion that inter-agency communication, while imperfect, was not the 
obvious culprit I had assumed.  Therefore, the logical next step is to examine what 
additional bureaucracies, i.e. the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) means to the 
system.  Likely, new bureaucracy translates into additional communication obstacles.  
As discussed in Chapter II, there are many disadvantages associated with 
bureaucracies.  Still, despite the recent terrorist attacks, the enormous bureaucracy that is 
the Intelligence Community (IC) performs quite well.  As Richard K. Betts 
acknowledged: 
 
Paradoxically, the news is worse than the angriest critics think, 
because the intelligence community has worked much better than they 
assume.  Contrary to the image left by the destruction of September 
11, U.S. intelligence and associated services have generally done very 
well at protecting the country.  In the aftermath of a catastrophe, great 
successes in thwarting previous terrorist attacks are too easily 
forgotten—successes such as the foiling of plots to bomb New York 
City’s Lincoln and Holland tunnels in 1993, to bring down eleven 
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American airliners in Asia in 1995, to mount attacks on the West 
Coast and in Jordan around the millennium and to strike U.S. forces in 
the Middle East in the summer of 2001.70 
 
 Given the complications associated with bureaucracy and the understanding that 
the IC has performed relatively well, it is reasonable to question one of our 
government’s answers to the attacks.  In the government’s rush to reorganize and “fix,” 
among other things, the IC’s communication problems, Congress authorized the Bush 
Administration to create a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Its goal is to 
merge the various intelligence agencies “under one roof” by adding thousands of new 
personnel to IC payrolls and increasing the amount of persons who hear, interpret, 
reinterpret, and disclose information—all in the name of “increased cooperation.”  Since 
our government has answered the new terrorist threat with another bureaucracy, it is 
important to understand what organizational research says about bureaucracies.   
 
Weber’s Organizational Form 
Those who have looked at intelligence organizations before 9-11 often refer to 
“bureaucratic difficulties,” but it is evident that researchers have presented no clear 
definition of bureaucracy. Instead, they attribute certain organizational traits to 
bureaucracy such as complexity/size issues or organizational rules and control factors.   
Fortunately, most of these ideas coincide with Max Weber’s thoughts on bureaucracy.  
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Weber argued that bureaucracy was the universal organizational form, and the elements 
that shaped it were threefold: rationalization, differentiation, and integration.71   
 Very few concepts have received as much attention as rationalization.  Robert A. 
Brady’s article on the meaning of rationalization determined it is “attached more or less 
at random to any and every technique, program, or plan of organization which promised 
to promote the technical or commercial ‘efficiency’ of individual enterprises, entire 
industries, or even the total of economic processes nationally or internationally 
considered.” 72  Simply, rationalization occurs when the organization applies behavioral 
rules in order to carry out its goals efficiently.  For our purposes, we will assume as 
Weber did, that rationalization occurs when operating procedures are specified, and 
those instructions become behavioral norms.  Unfortunately, when this process occurs, 
members of the organization can become constrained by what the organization 
determines most effective; thus individual thought and autonomy may become difficult.  
But while rationalization is not always positive, organizations often increase productivity 
because this process causes tasks to become routine, making challenges preventable and 
anticipatory. 
Differentiation refers to “the process of breaking work up into its various 
components.”73  As organizations grow in size, managers can become pressured to 
counter the challenges through bureaucratization.  In order to function as a productive 
organization, the newly-created work groups must then be integrated into one system 
that manages their efforts.  “The objective of division of work,” according to Henri 
Fayol,  
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is to produce more and better work with the same effort.  The worker 
who always makes the same part, or the manager who is always 
concerned with the same matters, acquires an ability, sureness, and 
accuracy which…usually lead to increased output.74 
 
This increased output has its drawbacks.  The paradox, according to Weber, is that 
organizational members become specialized and consequently too concerned with their 
own determined role in the hierarchy.  Their function becomes so specific their 
autonomy gets reduced, and they are unable to, in essence, “think outside the box.”   
Furthermore, Fred Dansreau and Steven E. Markham’s study of superior-
subordinate communication added that “complexity” represents the number of separate 
“parts” within an organization as reflected by the division of labor and by the number of 
both hierarchical levels and departments.75  Given what we know about the structure of 
the IC, we can safely assume it to be a complex organization.  In order to remain 
efficient, its members have detailed roles they must fulfill.   
  Also, the fact the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) are not included under the DHS develops other problems.  
Weber does assume that organizations, with the help of a guiding principle, do 
eventually become rationalized in a way that ensures their pieces fit (that is in fact what 
makes them efficient).  But these processes are distinctive in different organizations, 
possibly magnifying the potential for communication breakdowns across boundaries.   
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Complexity 
As an organizational structure becomes more complex, message flow becomes 
more difficult.  The more levels of the hierarchy that must be informed, the less time the 
organizations have to transmit messages to those who can deploy action.76  For example, 
in 1993 the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), through operation TERRSTOP, foiled 
the so-called "Day of Terror" plot to attack various New York City landmarks.  The Cell 
details the Force’s Neil Herman and his later frustration with the growing complexity of 
JTTF:   
 
JTTF was growing to meet its expanded mission, not just in 
manpower, but also in complexity.  The small, supple, close-knit unit 
that Herman had grown up with in the 1980s was now saddled with 
layers of bureaucracy, liaisons to other agencies, public relations.  
“You could not do another TERRSTOP investigation (by 1997),” 
Herman says.  “You could not penetrate a group, do physical and 
electronic surveillance and translate the information over a long period 
of time the way it was done.  You couldn’t hold on to the information.  
There were too many leaks, too much potential access, too many 
agencies, too many politicians who wanted to be briefed.”77 
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It is not that message flow always becomes “blocked” in a complex system.  In 
fact, the overall volume of messages may increase (possibly resulting in overload).78  In 
a complex organizational structure, though, messages must “change hands” so often that 
the initial information may become distorted, stopped or at least sluggish.  Fittingly, 
while studying complexity (that is, in relation to number of departments) in government 
bureaucracies, Bacharach and Aiken found a significant correlation between the 
frequency of upward communication and complexity of the organization.  Subordinate 
members in more complex organizations, they found, are less likely to communicate 
with their superiors. Therefore, what we can safely determine is that complexity can 
harm information flow in two noticeable ways: (1) Messages may be unduly and 
destructively increased or (2) they may be inhibited altogether.  In summary, complexity, 
an inherent byproduct of bureaucracy, is bad for communication. 
 
Divisions 
 We can use what we know about the conceptualization of bureaucracy to theorize 
about the events leading up to September 11 and the subsequent creation of bureaucracy.  
To begin, if we consider the FBI as a separate box within the entire IC organizational 
chart, it is evident the Bureau has specific functions that are separate from the other 
agencies.  The development of division of labor can be tracked historically.  After World 
War II it was proposed the wartime Office of Secret Service (OSS) would be continued 
under the name of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  J. Edgar Hoover, the then 
head of the FBI, fought the proposal on the grounds that two intelligence agencies were 
48 
unnecessary and would create overlapping job distinctions.  He eventually lost his 
argument, and the CIA was created with a mandate to handle overseas intelligence 
operations with the FBI separately dealing with domestic intelligence.   
As the FBI further developed, its understood function started to become that of 
prosecution of criminals instead of investigation and prevention of crimes. Perhaps the 
1984 trial of eight members of the New Afrikan Freedom Fighters (NAFF) helped create 
this disposition.  After the JTTF broke up an NAFF armored-car robbery plan, the 
Bureau learned the NAFF was planning a terrorism wave aimed at New York City.  The 
good news was they caught the terrorists before they could enact their plans; the bad 
news was the jury eventually acquitted the JTTF members from all serious charges.   
  The outcome of this trial may be one reason why counterterrorism efforts 
became secondary to the Bureau and why the FBI’s focus shifted mainly to prosecution. 
“Legally, the case presented by prosecutors was built on solid ground,” explained one 
researcher, “But the jury had delivered a very different message: If it hasn’t happened 
yet, it’s not a crime.  That message reverberated through the Bureau for years…”79 Huge 
amounts of money and resources were dedicated to this trial, and the Bureau’s 
investment was enormous.  In the end, its efforts proved almost futile.  After the trial, it 
was clear that preventative efforts were not efficient, and the most economical and 
resourceful undertakings were those based on building court cases against those who had 
already broken the law.  The FBI then began focusing its resources toward building 
successful court cases, and that meant an inclination toward prosecution—not 
prevention.   The same division was prevalent before September 11.  In fact, the 
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Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security found the, “FBI focus has been 
investigating terrorist acts, but it has placed less emphasis on preventing such acts.”80   
This strategy may have been a reason the FBI did not readily share information 
with the other intelligence organizations.  Considering the unimportance placed on 
preventative information, it would seem reasonable to suggest they simply 
underestimated the value of the information and disregarded that which was most useful 
to those dedicated to prevention. For example, as an outside observer, it may seem 
unreasonable that at least one FBI agent did not forward the Phoenix memo to the other 
intelligence agencies.  However, since rationalization inhibits autonomy, each agent that 
saw the memo, may have viewed it with concern but only through the understood 
rationale of the organization.  That is, since the memo was advocating preventative 
measures, it was deemed relatively unimportant.  Preventing terrorism was not their 
ultimate concern, so they failed to place importance on the distribution of important data 
to other agencies.  Where we see rationalization occurring is when the members mold 
their behavior to fit the organization’s tendencies, and the Phoenix memo may be a good 
example.   
While looking at the CIA’s behavior before 9-11, we can also determine that 
bureaucratic elements could have created information sharing problems.  When 
rationalization creates standard operating procedures, it also determines who can say 
what to whom and through what media and what channels.81 The understood role of the 
CIA is a largely secretive one.  Its operations are classified, its behavior reticent, and its 
communication limited.  The information sharing that should have been exhibited 
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between the organizations was stifled possibly because CIA members are normally 
secretive about their sources, their information, and their ideas.   
The CIA is understandably uncomfortable discussing every piece of information 
it obtains—especially since it may compromise its espionage efforts, and because it is 
often unsure what is important and what is not.  This may explain why the CIA tracked 
two of the 9-11 hijackers months before it ever alerted the FBI, why it waited too late to 
share Midhar’s full name, his passport number, and his birth information, and why it 
failed to tell the NSA the real name of Nawaf al-Hazmi noticed at the Malaysian 
meetings.  
In short, the operational actions within both organizations created two objectives 
in the CIA and the FBI that, because they were distinct, prevented them from completely 
cooperating.  The members of the CIA understood their job was to prevent terrorist acts, 
and the FBI was expected to prosecute those acts if they did in fact happen.  Messages 
related to prevention, then, were somewhat disregarded and not passed on.  The CIA, on 
the other hand, was rationalized to be as secretive as possible.  The Agency’s members, 
therefore, did not readily exchange information with the FBI.  When they finally got 
around to exchanging data, it was too late.   
In hindsight these specializations may seem like a shocking element of the 
situation, but they are certainly needed in order for the agencies to perform their tasks in 
the most efficient manner.  We need to ask ourselves at this point how much that is 
commonly referred to as “failures” in the intelligence organization before 9-11 can 
simply be attributed to the extremely important understood communicative and work 
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roles of the organizations.    By understanding why clearly defined barriers are 
important, we may better understand how “increased cooperation” may in fact harm the 
overall goal of the IC. 
On 14 October 2003 former CIA directors John Deutch and James Schlesinger 
presented a parallel argument before the 9-11 Independent Commission. Deutch, who 
favors radical realignment,82 believes “catastrophic terrorism and advanced information 
technologies . . . invalidate” traditional IC divisions.  To combat the emergent threat, he 
recommended, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should be given executive 
power over a new Domestic Intelligence Service (DIS).  The DIS would broaden the role 
of the DCI to defeat the problems associated with the growing combination of foreign 
and domestic threats.  
Adversely, Schlesinger cautioned that reorganization is risky: “It takes a while to 
settle down after surgery—and the disruptions that are inevitable are likely to distract us 
from the main goal—the improvement of the intelligence product.”  If intelligence is 
centralized and boundaries weakened, he stated, “Intelligence activities would be 
recreated in departments, agencies, and the several commands.”83   Broadening the scope 
of the DCI would add ambiguity to the role of the Agency.  And, if the Agency’s 
traditional role (that is, handling international threats) is distorted, the result may be 
confusion, redundancy, and inefficiency.  Recognizing that drastic reorganization can 
create uncertain roles and possible redundancy, the IC should resist immediate 
restructuring and preserve traditional divisions of labor.  Certainly the atypical terrorist 
threat requires adjustments, but alterations should be enacted delicately.   Efficiency 
52 
should not be compromised for reconfiguration; the U.S. does not have enough 
intelligence personnel to chance redundancy. Reorganization may disrupt an already 
well-defined and able system—when effective and proficient components are most 
important.   
 
Conflict 
 The inherent nature of bureaucracies to specialize can cause conflict across 
agency borders, especially when specific roles are ambiguous and tensions arise because 
of that uncertainty.  The December 2002 Congressional report on September 11 
determined that role confusion was a noteworthy hindrance to the sharing of 
information.  For example, the Inquiry noted one instance between the CIA and the 
National Security Agency (NSA), the extremely secretive agency responsible for 
intelligence cryptology efforts.  The account follows: 
 
[NSA and CIA officers often worked closely together in [ ] collection 
efforts against al-Qa’ida. The two agencies conducted [ ] operations, 
And these operations often met with some success. However, one type 
of these operations – [] – caused much friction between NSA and CIA. 
This was especially true at the mid- and upper-management levels 
where struggles developed regarding which agency was in charge of 
developing and using such technology when human intelligence and 
signals intelligence targets overlapped. CIA perceived NSA as wanting 
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to control technology deployment and development, while [page 80] 
NSA was concerned that CIA was conducting NSA-type operations. 
The NSA Chief of Data Acquisition noted to the Inquiry that this has 
been an issue during his entire tour of almost three years. These 
frictions persisted even after the September 11 attacks. In the first six 
months of 2002, for example, no less than seven executive-level 
memoranda (including one from the President) were issued in attempts 
to delineate CIA and NSA responsibilities and authorities in this 
collection area]. 84 (emphasis added) 
 
This description notes how conflicts can stem from the “divisions of labor,” and not 
what some researchers may determine as “rivalry” between the different agencies.  
These instances can better be described as disagreements regarding the various roles.  
Consequently, in this particular situation, they were not competing against each other in 
the sense they were struggling for different goals, but they were arguing over whose 
responsibility it was to perform certain duties.  Just as an offense and defense on a 
football team may both desire to be on the punting squad, they are not in rivalry with one 
another—just puzzled by the fact the coach did not explain their duties to a clear extent.  
Likewise, the FBI and CIA were on the same team, but the IC did not have a clear policy 
regarding the different roles in this sort of situation. 
 While organizations must specialize in order to be efficient, the paradox is there 
are inherent problems associated with that process. The “root” of this problem in the IC 
54 
was not a limit on communication.  The hindrance lay in that the members did not 
clearly understand what their duties entailed—an organizational problem and not 
necessarily a communication problem. 
 
Solving the “Cooperation Problem” 
 To fix the troubles with information sharing and role confusion, many of the 9-11 
researchers argue the IC should cooperate more fully with each other; but the devil is in 
the details.  While “more cooperation” sounds like an admirable goal, the IC should be 
careful it does not overreact.  If the barriers between the divisions of labor become 
blurry between the agencies, it is possible their duties may overlap—causing valuable 
resources to be used inefficiently.   Likewise, if the agencies confuse their roles and 
begin sharing too much information, it will possibly result in just that—too much 
information.  So the answer here, while not simple, is certainly not more bureaucracy. 
 
 
Homeland Security 
There are several instances in the research that suggest some elements in the IC 
were communicating quite well.  It was reported that during the infamous Malaysia 
meeting, a CIA employee actually emailed an FBI agent the following: 
 
This continues to be an (intelligence) operation.  Thus far, a lot 
of suspicious activity has been observed but nothing that would 
indicate evidence of an impending attack or criminal enterprise.  
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Told (the first FBI agent) that as soon as something concrete is 
developed leading us to the criminal arena or to known FBI 
cases, we will immediately bring FBI into the loop.  Like (the 
first FBI agent) yesterday, (the second FBI agent) stated that this 
was a fine approach and thanked me for keeping him in the 
loop.85 
 
While Congress has chastised this round of communication regarding the Malaysia 
meetings because there was no mention of al-Midhar’s visa information, this email does 
not suggest there were communication problems.  It actually acknowledges that the 
agencies were committed to cooperating in this scenario.  It is entirely possible the 
parties in this case understandably made calculations about the data they were obtaining, 
recognized their specific roles, and made judgments as to the importance of sharing data.  
These evaluations can and should be expected given the extreme amount of messages 
acquired by the IC.  The members cannot be expected to share every piece of 
information.  In this case, the organizational members may have been wrong to deem 
this information unimportant, but in order to remain efficient, members must draw 
conclusions about the relevance and worthiness of material before they pass it on.  
Otherwise, too much information will be generated, and we could get some of the 
problems associated with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. 
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Conclusion 
The assumption of most research on 9-11 is that new intelligence bureaucracies 
should be formed in the name of “cooperation,” but given the drawbacks associated with 
bureaucracies, it makes sense the United States government should reconsider their 
creation.  Since all the investigators can assuredly say is that some information, in 
retrospect, may have been “potentially important,”86 we might ask: are new 
bureaucracies going to help?  
Furthermore, the boundaries between the divisions of duties should not be 
blurred in the name of “cooperation.”  Instead, the roles should be more clearly 
defined—leading to less confusion and overlapping of work procedures.  Increased 
cooperation should be replaced with smart cooperation.  Messages that are deemed 
irrelevant should still be inhibited, and we should avoid the temptation to completely 
cooperate—the efficiency and effectiveness of our IC depend on it. 
In our search to repair the IC and prevent future attacks, we have, in some sense, 
overreacted and focused too much on one extreme of the situation—communication.  To 
fix these minute communication problems, we are increasing bureaucracy, and in doing 
so, our government may have responded to a problem that was insignificant with a 
source of more challenging communication difficulties.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
 
This chapter will review what we have learned and contend that our government, 
in its ambition to “fix” communication problems, is discounting beneficial changes and 
considering harmful alterations to the intelligence system.  Afterwards, an attempt is 
made to understand the hasty scapegoating of communication.  I lastly present a brief 
discussion of possible future research. 
Qualitative research can remind a writer he is fallible.  When I started researching, I 
was convinced the Intelligence Community’s (IC) problems were communicative.  I was 
sure that, after reading the reports about communication flow and information sharing before 
9-11, I could apply organizational communication theory to the numerous communication 
breakdowns and save the world.  What I found was not that simple.  Communication, while 
a handy and effective scapegoat, was not the significant problem I had imagined.   
“Communication breakdowns” have been widely accepted as a major culprit in 
intelligence problems before 9-11. After the Joint Congressional Inquiry on 9-1187 was 
released, that conclusion became official.  Below are only a few headlines that followed the 
report: 
 
Congressional report on 9/11 rips FBI, CIA; Investigators say clues 
were abundant, agencies failed to see connections; Better 
communication might have prevented attacks, joint panel says88 
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FBI lost plot in the run-up to 9-11 attacks; Communications 
breakdowns blamed89 
 
 9/11 report cites CIA, FBI lapses; Damning congressional inquiry 
says failures and poor communication in trailing San Diego-based 
hijackers hurt the 'best chance' to foil the plot90 (emphasis added) 
 
It seems quite obvious to decision-makers in Washington D.C. and the general public 
that proper communication could have prevented the attacks.  However, I have discovered 
communication was not the substantial problem projected.   
 
Review 
This study’s justification was fairly simple.  Because the United States should try to 
understand 9-11 through various angles, it made sense to uniquely study the story through an 
organizational communication lens.  Throughout the history of our country, we have used 
our intellects to determine lessons from attacks on our soil.  The most relevant example was 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.  Research on the event enlightened the U.S. government 
about serious weaknesses in the intelligence system.  The investigations discovered the 
existence of “noise” in the system, and the government realized that irrelevant material 
could possibly suffocate relevant data.  More communication, researchers realized, did not 
necessarily produce better results.   
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In Chapter I, we also learned intelligence failures are inevitable.  Fittingly, Richard 
K. Betts presented several improper reactions to breakdowns.  To correct communication 
problems, governments poorly respond by (1) focusing on every analyst’s opinion (no 
matter how outlandish), (2) assuming the worst in each situation, and (3) producing more 
(not better) analysis. These behaviors clog the system and divert attention from sound 
practices and wise determinations.  Thus, Betts believes governments should realize the 
“lessons of hindsight do not guaranty improvement in foresight.”91  Instead, adjustments in 
the system should be considered with a fatalist approach and an understanding that even 
“rationalized information systems cannot fully compensate for the predisposition, perceptual 
idiosyncrasies, and time constraints of political consumers.”92  Therefore, another common 
governmental response, reorganization, to Betts, “is an alluring but illusory quick fix.”93  
Although Betts warned me my research could prove futile, I sought in Chapter II 
simply to understand how messages could be disrupted, distorted, or blocked entirely by 
certain traits inherent in organizations.  If I could understand the innate communication 
problems, I reasoned, I could surely use my thesis to apply that knowledge to the IC. 
Frankly, after determining that message breakdowns can occur at various levels for abundant 
reasons, I was even more confident—surely I could fill a thesis with a substantial amount of 
examples.      
In Chapter III, I sought those examples by laying out the purely communicative 
problems the IC exhibited before 9-11.  After reviewing and rehashing the story focusing 
only on genuine communication breakdowns, I found very little information.  In short, in the 
enormous amount of data, I could not find enough instances of authentic, pure 
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communication mishaps to suggest a substantial breakdown had occurred—a result I was 
unprepared to find. 
Since I could uncover little evidence to suggest communication was a significant 
factor, I have concluded that while there were distinct instances where information might 
have been shared across boundaries, they were not enough to suggest the system should be 
significantly overhauled.  Still, our government has overhauled the system.  The creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) added thousands of people to the latest and 
greatest government bureaucracy. An understanding of the nature of bureaucracies, found in 
Chapter IV, helped us conclude the DHS could, in fact, further the problems it is designed to 
solve.  Bureaucracies are naturally susceptible to inherent and often untreatable 
communication faults, so it made sense to mention the additional communication baggage 
almost certain to arrive with a new organization.  
Like most bureaucracies, many of the communication “breakdowns” before 9-11 
can be traced to reasonable organizational practices—division of labor development, 
barriers to information flow, and reasoned information sharing.  The IC should not 
completely dismiss these characteristics simply in the name of “cooperation.”  If 
anything, they should more clearly define barriers of labor, communication, and data 
sharing.  
To encourage reorganization, critics have commented that rivalries between the 
agencies (especially the CIA and FBI) had a sizeable influence on the sharing of data.  This 
is similarly misinformed.   What some have determined to be linked to conflict between the 
parts of the organization may simply be a result of labor boundaries.  Again, large 
61 
organizations, in order to be efficient, must adhere to divisions of labor.  In many instances, 
CIA and FBI members did not share information as a result of their understood roles and 
reasonable decisions regarding what should be communicated.  Many skeptics still claim 
that intra-agency rivalry caused some members to deny vital information to the other 
agencies.  But there is little to no evidence to suggest this is the case.  As one retired CIA 
officer told me, “After the critics present the accepted analysis of insufficient coordination, 
their next step is always to assume some scheme or ulterior motive on behalf of intelligence 
personnel.  But that is so far from the truth.”94  He continued to say that the historical 
tension between the FBI and CIA, most prevalent during the Hoover years, is rarely 
exhibited today. 
 
A Final Word on the Structure of the DHS 
Right now our government is debating the structure of the new DHS.  As we saw 
in Chapter IV, the creation of an extra bureaucracy may serve to increase 
communication problems where only minimal ones existed.  Additional “mouths to 
feed” may result in information overload and lead to the kind of problems that resulted 
in the Pearl Harbor tragedy.  Even if one accepts the idea that communication problems 
played a large role in the September 11 failures, the United States should take a hard 
look at the inherent communicative problems associated with bureaucracies. To combat 
communication difficulties, we may only compound them.  While the goal of  “increased 
cooperation” sounds important, that cooperation will lead to overlapping duties and 
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more “noise” in the information flow.  This will lead to ineffective, slow, and inefficient 
organizational practices. 
Advocates of the new department have said it is simply a reorganization of the 
system “under one roof.”  At the moment, the exact form of this reorganization is unclear, 
but information flow research suggests there are many challenges ahead. Even if this is just 
an IC merger, it is the largest, most profound blend of organizations this country has ever 
seen.  As the director of the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, Mitchell E. 
Daniels Jr. analogized it, “In some respects, this isn’t AOL Time Warner.  It’s AOL-
TimeWarner-Microsoft-FedEX-hyphen-hyphen-hyphen.”95 The IC might be better served 
avoiding the bog of this proposed merger and leaving the different agencies to perform their 
tasks without the weighty burden of additional bureaucracy.  Ivan Elan of the Cato Institute 
agrees: 
 
…the new department may actually reduce U.S. security by adding 
bureaucracy rather than reducing it. More bureaucracy means more 
coordination problems of the kind that seem to have been prevalent in 
the intelligence community prior to September 11… the reorganization 
will make the government even less likely to put the jigsaw puzzle 
together and even more ungainly and sluggish in combating 
terrorists.96 
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As most recognize, al Qaeda is a nimble organization able to make quick 
adjustments to their organization and strategy.  In combating this new type of threat, the 
U.S. government should do everything it can to streamline the IC to make it quicker and 
more adapt to fighting.  We need an agile, liberated workforce that can think and act 
quickly. The more bureaucracy, the slower we will become, and the terrorists may exploit 
that weakness.  As we saw in the Congressional report, the most prevalent communication 
problem was simply that the right decisions were too late.   
 Instead of increasing the levels of the intelligence bureaucracy, perhaps we should 
look to eliminate some levels in the system.  As the same Cato Institute researcher remarked, 
“Cutting…[should]…come before pasting.”97  That is, our government should look into 
what levels could be removed to make our intelligence actions quicker and more capable of 
adjustments.  For instance, some suggest that dismantling several management positions 
within the FBI would simplify their organization and increase productivity. 
There are certain reasonable reforms advocated by Congress and other research 
entities.  The practice of watchlisting dangerous individuals to keep them from entering the 
United States can be an effective tool in information sharing.  Both watchlisting and a 
national terrorist database can serve to improve the power of the IC.  At the very least, it can 
alert officials that other agencies consider certain persons to be “of interest.”  These 
improvements do not necessitate the manpower or the massive bureaucratic structure the 
DHS requires. 
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The Misguided Academic Focus 
 Communications scholars habitually reduce bureaucratic problems to some sort of 
communication difficulties—we find ourselves paying too much attention to 
communications aspects without clearly reviewing their significance.  This may be because 
we are self-serving, or we may sincerely believe most problems are caused by 
communication shortcomings.  For whatever reason, qualitative research has given the 
academic world a useful outlook.  That is, a researcher should be open to discovering the 
unexpected.  Admittedly, I anticipated the failure was due to communication problems, but 
9-11 was more of an intelligence-gathering problem than a communication one. 
Still, the Congressional Inquiry seems overly willing to blame 9-11 failures on a lack 
of communication and cooperation--claiming that when bits and piece of information are 
considered for their “collective significance”98 they point to a 9-11 style attack.  Given the 
massive amounts of information in the intelligence system, is this a fair estimate?  Could it 
be that we would be better served to determine why we had so little information to share?  
Perhaps it is easier to spotlight information that was lost, misinterpreted, or altered than to 
decry the lack of intelligence in the first place. Recall, the United States only had 
information regarding 3 of the 19 hijackers, and even those facts were scarce.   
 
Suggested Research 
 The possibilities for research in this area are numerous.  The enormous amount of 
data has produced several angles by which scholars can study the IC.  It is helpful to our 
study to mention a few.   
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 First, there is sufficient research to suggest the IC should focus more on speeding up 
the decision-making process.  As mentioned earlier, some suggest it should remove 
department levels in an effort to streamline the procedures.  Researchers may want to look at 
the information sharing within the intelligence organizations, determine the path of relevant 
information, and discuss why it did not reach superiors in a timely manner.  A level-by-level 
analysis of information flow could uncover some useful suggestions regarding the 
dismantling of certain positions that are unnecessary to the agencies. 
 Second, future research may focus on organizational rhetoric in the “selling” of the 
DHS.  The implications of the politicization of intelligence decisions should be carefully 
examined, and determining a successful way to admit failure without making drastic 
changes could prove useful to future heads of state.  How can Congress and the President 
convince the American people that a change-little approach is warranted when an attack of 
this sort causes the public to inevitably call for extreme measures? 
 Lastly, if we can get over the idea that “communication is everything,” more 
research can be done to determine practical adjustments we can make in our fight against 
terrorism.  Right now we have no way to effectively track foreigners within our borders, and 
watchlisting and tracing them is oftentimes considered un-American.  Given the recent 
challenges, some suggest the U.S. require a visitor identification card for all those who 
obtain visas to travel to America.  The card would be used to determine where visitors are, 
what they are doing, and, more importantly, when they leave the States.  While we are 
welcoming strangers into our land, we should be more careful to watch their activities, being 
sure they leave when their stay is complete.  This type of measure, like the Patriot Act, can 
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be politically unpopular, but it may be necessary if we are serious about the protection of our 
country. 
 
Conclusion 
 It summary, 9-11 research has paid too much attention to one extreme of the 
situation.  The communication breakdowns that did occur were relatively insignificant.    
Only when we achieve that realization can we focus on the noteworthy issues.  For instance, 
did the CIA have enough manpower for human intelligence gathering within al-Qaeda?  Did 
the FBI have enough funds to send agents around to check every flight school in the 
country?  These seem to be legitimate grievances.  My research does suggest resource 
problems were almost certainly more important than alleged communication breakdowns.  
Conceivably, the answer lies in the inevitability of terrorism intelligence failures.  It 
is impossible to completely predict and/or thwart terrorist activities, but it may be more 
difficult to admit that we will lose various battles.  According to Richard Betts,  
 
The underlying cause of mistakes in performance does not lie in the 
structure and process of the intelligence system.  It is intrinsic to the 
issues and targets with which intelligence has to cope: the crafty 
opponents who strategize against it and the alien cultures that are not 
transparent to American minds.99 
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This opinion suggests we simply had a misguided strategy and lost a fight.  Our intelligence 
is first-class; its victories far outnumber its losses.  But, fatalistic as it sounds, the terrorists 
should be expected to win every once in a while.  As heinous and as gut-wrenching as their 
behavior certainly was; it was well planned; it was well executed, and nearly every detail 
was performed accurately.  On the other hand, the IC failed to recognize the significance of 
the threat posed by al-Qaeda and did not focus resources enough to thwart the terror 
ambitions.  In short, they beat us.   
This thesis may seem overly pessimistic and critical, but I would like to 
acknowledge that, even though I have reservations about our reactions to the assault, I 
still have extreme confidence in the IC, the Bush Administration, and Congress.  This 
confidence is certainly not undeserved.  Since the attacks, we have realigned our sights 
to focus clearly on al-Qaeda.  And though some may question the methods of our 
government, the safe-haven that was the Taliban regime has been overthrown, terrorist 
money assets have been frozen, and a large percentage of al-Qaeda members have been 
captured or killed.  On September 11, the U.S. lost a battle in the war against terrorism. 
That is sure. But in the end, history will recognize the swift, severe, and victorious 
response of the United States of America. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Klaus Knorr “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis” World Politics 16 (1964): 455.  While this writing is relatively old, the 
basic premise is arguably true today.  It is interesting to note that Klaus did remark that, 
“occasionally an interesting document reaches the public.” (455) Fortunately, in this, the 
public has been privileged to have access to several “interesting documents” that we will 
expound upon.  
 
2 The regularity of surprise attacks is mentioned in several academic works.  The most 
frequently cited are the Nazi invasion of Russia, and the Japanese attacks on Pearl 
Harbor.  A thorough discussion of this can be found in Richard K. Betts “Analysis, War, 
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